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PRE-EMPTION BY STATE OVER PENAL ORDINANCES
Municipalities have, as a general rule, been granted the
exercise of certain regulatory powers in areas of local concern,
these powers being limited by the general laws of the state.1
Clearly, when obvious conflict exists between ordinance and
general law, the ordinance must yield. 2 Unfortunately in many
cases the determination of whether or not conflict exists is
extremely difficult.
A recent California case, In Re Lane,' brings squarely to
issue the conflict of a municipal penal ordinance enacted in
an area already entered into by the general law. The defen-
dant was tried and convicted of the crime of "resorting" under
a Los Angeles ordinance. 4 The general law of the state covered
prostitution and other forms of illegal carnal intercourse, but
contained no provision pertaining to simple fornication. On
appeal to the Supreme Court of California, the ordinance was
held to be an invalid exercise of municipal power in an area
intended to be pre-empted by the state. In so holding the
court stated, "It is therefore clear that the Legislature has
determined by implication that such conduct shall not be crim-
inal in this state."'5 (emphasis added)
In re Lane would seem to indicate that the age of free wheel-
ing homerule is running aground. It is submitted that by so
holding the Supreme Court of California has effectively cur-
tailed the municipalities of its state, at least in the area of
penal ordinances.
BASIS OF THE MUNICIPALITIES' JURISDICTION
The basis of the municipalities' jurisdiction over criminal
offenses depends upon municipal charters, statutes, and judi-
1. See City of Mobile v. Madison, 40 Ala. 713, 122 So. 2d 540, 541 (1960)
"The City of Mobile being a creature of the state cannot contravene the
laws and policy of its creator, the State of Alabama;" 72 Harv. L. Rev. 737,
741 (1959) Using the liberal 'Home Rule' as an indication of what is local;
"(A) home-rule grant is generally held to permit a municipality to act in
the fields of taxation, public utilities, education, health, liquor regulation,
traffic control; and rent control." The 'home-rule,' of course represents the
furthest extension of municipal power.
2. City of Alexandria v. LaCombe, 220 La. 618, 57 So. 2d 206 (1952) State
had defined gambling and the municipality by ordinance made a further
definition. The ordinance was held void because the state intended to oc-
cupy the field.
3. 18 Cal. Rptr. 33, 367 P.2d 673 (1962).
4. § 41.07 of the Los Angeles Municipal Code provided: "No person shall
resort to any .... residence, apartment house,... for the purpose of hav-
ing sexual intercourse with a person to whom he or she is not married ...."
5. In re Lane, supra note 3, at 34.
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cial construction of the enabling acts.6 Municipalities have de-
rived their jurisdiction in two ways, by home rule or by legis-
lative grant.
A number of states have given cities jurisdiction over acts
which concern purely municipal affairs.7 This granting of con-
trol over the health, welfare, and morals of the community is
known as home rule.8 Under home rule municipalities may
regulate offenses so long as the ordinance is not unreasonable, 9
unjust or illegally discriminatory between persons in similar
circumstances. 1° This power has even been extended into the
area of penal ordinances so long as the ordinance does not con-
flict with the general laws of the state,1 or with the federal or
state constitutions.
2
Municipalities, being creatures of the state, may also derive
jurisdiction over certain criminal acts by specific legislative
grant, even though the acts punished by the ordinance are
crimes against the state. 13 Where the power to enact penal
ordinances has been granted, municipalities are still restricted
to such ordinances not in conflict with the criminal laws of the
state. 4 In the absence of home rule or legislative grant, it is
contended that municipalities have not the power to confer on
themselves jurisdiction to punish criminal offenses of state-
wide concern.
PENAL AND NON-PENAL ORDINANCES
At common law prosecutions for the violation of municipal
ordinances were treated as civil actions; imprisonment was
not looked upon as punishment, but as a means of enforcing
6. See 6 McQuillin, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 23.05 (3d ed. 1949).
7. See, e.g., Woolverton v. City and County of Denver, 361 P.2d 982
(Colo. 1961); city of Portland v. Welch, 154 Ore. 286, 59 P.2d 228 (1936);
see 1 McQuillin, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 3.21 (3d ed. 1949).
8. See e.g., California for an example of a Constitution granting home
rule: CAL. CONST. Art XI, § 11 (1954); Under home rule the following are
typical example of areas in which municipal ordinances will control: Press-
man v. Barnes, 209 Md. 544, 121 A.2d 816 (1956) (traffic within a city);
Heubeck v. City of Baltimore, 205 Md. 203, 107 A.2d 99 (1954) (rent control);
Anderson v. City of Two Harbors, 244 Minn. 466, 70 N.W.2d 414 (1955)
(health: home rule council has the discretion to appropriate money to a
hospital).
9. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. City of Charlottesville, 42 F.2d
88 (1930).
10. Yickw v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1885).
11. Square Deal Coal Haulers, and Yardmen's Club, Inc., 176 N.E.2d
348 (Ohio 1961).
12. Adams v. City of New Kensington, 357 Pa. 557, 55 A.2d 392 (1947).
13. See People v. Hanrahan, 75 Mich. 611, 42 N.W. 1124, 1126 (1889) (re-
sorting to house of illfame); Richards v. Town of Magnolia, 100 Miss. 249,
56 So. 386 (1911).
14. People v. Thatcher, 190 Misc. 249, 73 N.Y.S.2d 655 (1947).
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payment. 15 Based on this reasoning the majority of municipal-
ities hold that ordinance violations are civil wrongs against
the community even though payment of the penalty is enforc-
ed by detention.16 However, the power to fine and imprison
municipal offenders may be abused by cities. One jurisdiction
has allowed a municipality to punish an offender for assault
and battery more severely than the state would have for the
same offense. 1 There are, however, limits to the municipali-
ties' powers to punish ordinance offenders.
Generally felonies' s and gross or indictable misdemeanors's
cannot be dealt with by ordinances since they are regarded by
the legislatures as being beyond the scope of municipal con-
cern. It is also true that not every penalty imposed by a mun-
icipal ordinance is always civil in nature. Many actions are
quasi-criminal in character. 2 0 When the penalties in such ac-
tions take on a strictly criminal character such as imprison-
ment or excessive fines the ordinance is no longer civil but
criminal and should be struck down. Since violation of a mun-
icipal ordinance results in a civil action punishment must be
limited to forfeiture, or imprisonment only to the extent of
enforcing such forfeiture.2
1
Therefore, it is submitted that municipalities be only allow-
ed to impose fines for the violation of civil offenses against
the community. The penalty imposed by a municipal ordinance
is no longer in the nature of a ciVil fine when the city prohibits
the same conduct prohibited by state criminal laws, commits
an offender to prison, or imposes excessive fines. When penal
penalties are imposed by a municipality, such ordinances
should be declared invalid because "the sovereign alone can
create a crime. ' --
PENAL PARALLEL ORDINANCES
In the area of municipal penal ordinances, cities have enact-
ed ordinances exactly paralleling state statutes. The validity
15. Village of Litchville v. Hanson, 79 N.D. 672, 124 N.W. 1119 (1910).
16. Fortune v. Incorporated Town of Wilburton, 142 Fed. 114 (1905);
City of Chicago v. Williams, 254 Ill. 360, 98 N.E. 666 (1912); see 9 McQUIL-
LEN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 27.06 (3d ed. 1950).
17. In re Calloun, 87 Ohio 193, 94 N.E.2d 388 (1949).
18. Thompson v. City of Sylacauga, 30 Ala. 72, 200 So. 795 (1941); Dis-
mukes v. Town of Louisville, 101 Miss. 132, 57 So. 547 (1912).
19. State v. Frederic, 28 Idaho 709, 155 Pac. 977 (1916).
20. City of Moultrie v. Cslki, 71 Ga. 13, 29 S.E.2d 785 (1944); City of
Milwaukee v. lRuplinger, 155 Wis. 391, 145 N.W. 42 (1914).
21. State v. Schmiege, 28 N.W.2d 345 (Wis. 1947).
22. Id. at 348.
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of such parallel ordinances depends on the jurisdiction's inter-
pretation of whether a municipal offender may be tried both
under the statute and the ordinance.
The majority rule appears to be that there may be prosecu-
tion and punishment under the ordinance as well as prosecu-
tion and punishment under statute for the same act.23 Parallel
penal ordinances seem to have been upheld in the Federal
Courts' determination of Guidoni v. Wheeler: 24
"It is well settled that an act may be made a penal of-
fense under the statute of a state, and also made punish-
able under an ordinance of a municipal corporation."
The basis of this reasoning is that offenses against a muni-
cipality and the state are distinguishable and the prosecution
of each proceeds upon a different hypothesis. 25 Therefore, the
violation of a municipal ordinance is not a crime or criminal
offense against the state but only against the municipal cor-
poration enacting the ordinance or regulation.26 Prosecution
may be carried on by either the municipality or the state with-
out constituting double jeopardy. 27 in these cases the dual
sovereignties of the state and federal governments is held to
be analogous. 23 Whether or not such dual sovereignty is anal-
ogous to the relationship between municipalities and states is
an open question.
The minority view is that parallel ordinances punishing acts
already penal and punishable under the general laws of the
state are invalid. 29 The reason that parallel ordinances are
struck down is that the state has entered the field by enacting
complete and comprehensive regulations so there is no room
for ordinances. 3 0 Other courts have held that a municipal or-
dinance punishing an act made penal by a state law covering
the same subject material must yield to the state law because
of duplication.
3 1
23. See State v. Poynter, 70 Idaho 438, 220 P.2d 386 (1950); Town 
of
Bloomfield v. Trimble, 54 Iowa 399, 6 N.W. 586 (1880); Harlow v. Clow, 110
Or. 257, 223 Pac. 541 (1924); 6 McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§
23.10, .12 (3d ed. 1949).
24. 230 Fed. 93, 96 (9th Cir. 1916).
25. Perry v. City of Birmingham, 38 Ala. App. 460, 88 So. 2d 577 (1956).
26. Ibid.
27. McLaughlinn v. Stephens, 16 Fed. Cas. 234 (No. 8,874) (C.C.D.C.
1818); State of Minnesota v. Lee, 29 Minn. 445, 13 N.W. 913 (1882).
28. 6 McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, § 23.10 (3d ed. 1949); el.
109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 290 (1960).
29. Landford v. Alfriend, 147 Ga. 811, 95 S.E. 688 (1918); State v. McCoy,
116 N.C. 1059, 21 S.E. 690 (1895); State v. Keith, 94 N.C. 933 (1886); see 6
McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 23.11 (3d ed. 1949).
30. Commonwealth v. Wolbarst, 319 Mass. 291, 65 N.E.2d 552 (1946).
31. People v. Villarino, 134 Cal. App. 2d 893, 286 P.2d 86 (1955); Jenkins
v. Jones, 209 Ga. 758, 75 SE.2d 815 (1953).
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A third view holds that punishment by a municipality is a
bar to being tried again by the state.3 2 These courts permit a
parallel ordinance to stand but allow the defense of double
jeopardy.
It is submitted that where a subject is covered by statute,
a municipal corporation cannot deal with such matters by
parallel ordinances unless expressly authorized by the state.
If not authorized, municipal parallel ordinances should be
struck down because the state has entered the field. The
writer feels that there cannot be double punishment on the
theory that one criminal offense is an offense against both the
state and the municipality. There is no rationalizing a deci-
sion like Slayton v. State, 3 in which the defendant was con-
victed under a city ordinance, and subsequently convicted by
the state for the same offense. The court held that there may
be prosecution and punishment under the ordinance as well as
prosecution under statute for the same act.
Error would seem to be committed by the adoption of the
federal-state analogy as to the validity of parallel ordinances.
In the federal-state situation there are two separate sover-
eigns, but a municipality is not a sovereign apart from the
state. A municipality is a creature of the state.
ORDINANCES CREATING CONFLICTS
Generally under home rule and legislative grant a municipal-
ity cannot enact any ordinances which are in conflict with the
general laws of the state.3 4 Traditionally, a municipal ordin-
ance is in conflict with the state statutes when the ordinance
prohibits what the other permits or vice versa.35 However, this
test is not infallible. What is the result when the municipal-
ity provides for a greater penalty than the state? What is to
prevent a city from punishing what the state has not prohibit-
ed?
The most obvious conflict between state statutes and munici-
pal ordinances is the ordinance providing a different penalty."e
There appears to be a split of authority as to whether or
32. State v. Flint, 63 Conn. 248, 28 Atl. 28 (1893); Ex parte Freeland,
38 Tex. Ct. App. R. 321, 42 S.W. 295 (1897).
33. 31 Ala. App. 622, 21 So. 2d 122 (1945).
34. Supra note 10, 12, and 13.
35. Village of Struthers v. Sokol, 108 Ohio St. 263, 140 N.E. 519 (1923).
36. See State v. Weeks, 216 Minn. 279, 12 N.W.2d 493 (1943).
1962]
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not an ordinance providing for a lesser penalty conflicts with
the state statute. In City of Wink v. Griffith Amusement Co.
3 7
an ordinance provided for a lesser penalty than the statute.
The court held:
"The rule is definitely established with us that the penal
provisions of the ordinance cannot be different for those
of the Penal Code for the same offense . .. ."
On the other hand, ordinances providing for a lesser penalty
than the state, have been upheld.
3 8
Just as some jurisdictions have upheld ordinances providing
a lesser penalty than the statute, other courts have upheld or-
dinances providing a greater penalty than the statute.3 9 In the
case of In re Calhoun,40 an ordinance prescribing a greater
penalty than the state for assault and battery was upheld. The
court held that the test for conflict was whether the ordinance
permits that which the statute prohibits or vice versa, rather
than the penalties prescribed were different.
To circumvent the obvious conflict between terminology and
penalties used in ordinances and statutes, a group of cases
have held:
"(A) municipality may punish for an act which is for-
bidden by the penal laws of the state, if into the act penal-
ized by the ordinance there enters some essential ingredi-
ent not necessary to constitute the statutory of-
fense . . . ,
Moving out of the area of discrepancy between wording and
penalties, there is an area where the ordinance and the statute
punish different offenses. Conflict becomes evident when a
municipality permits what a state has prohibited. Such ordi-
nances are usually declared void.4 2 The conflict does not clear-
ly present itself when the municipality punishes what the
state has not prohibited. Here too there is a split of author-
ity. Some courts have held that municipalities may punish in
areas where the state has not acted as long as the state has
not declared the act legal.4 3 The city under this theory may
37. 129 Tex. 40, 100 S.W.2d 695 (1936); Landis v. Borough of Vineland,
54, N.J. 104, 23 Atl. 357 (1892).
38. City of Moberly v. Deskin, 169 Mo. App. 672, 155 S.W. 842 (1913).
39. Shaw v. City of Norfolk, 167 Va. 346. 189 S.E. 335 (1937) (Dictum).
40. 87 Ohio App. 193, 94 N.E.2d 388 (1949).
41. Howell v. State, 13 Ga. App. 74, 78 S.E. 859 (1913); Wright v. City
of Atlanta, 61 Ga. App. 650, 7 S.E.2d 215 (1940).
42. State v. City of Youngstown, 68 Ohio App. 254, 40 N.E.2d 477 (1941);
cf. City of Fargo v. Sathre, 76 N.D. 341, 36 N.W.2d 39 (1949).
43. Village of Struthers v. Sokol, supra note 35.
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expand the state law as in the case of Ex Parte Hong Shin.
4
Here the state regulated the sale of opium by requiring cer-
tain labeling. A San Francisco ordinance required sale of
opium on prescription of a medical graduate only. The court
held the ordinance valid:
"While the regulation is different from that of the
state, there is no conflict and therefore it is not in viola-
tion of the provision of the constitution . . .45
Some examples of areas in which municipal ordinances have
punished what the state has not prohibited are lottery,4 6 gam-
bling,47 slot and pinball machines.4"
The opposite view is that a municipality cannot pass a crim-
inal ordinance more comprehensive than the state statute on
the same subject.
49
It is felt that there is little need for a municipality to invade
the penal areas controlled by the state. There would seem to be
no reason why a city should supplement a state statute. A
municipality should not be allowed to convict under an ordin-
ance prescribing a greater penalty than that which the state
provides. A city is not a separate sovereign apart from the
state with the authority to punish offenses of state wide con-
cern. This function is left to the state legislature. It is sub-
mitted that municipal ordinances are in conflict with the gen-
eral laws of the state where they impose additional require-
ments, different penalties, or prohibit what the state permits.
PRE-EMPTION AND SILENCE
Often in the discussion and supporting authority of the
cases in this area, there is to be found little or no distinction
between the civil and the criminal50 Due to the fact that in
statutory jurisdictions the common law has been superseded,
and crimes against the state are only those offenses as are
44. 98 Cal. 681, 33 Pac. 799 (1893).
45. Id.
46. Reid v, Perkerson, 207 Ga. 27, 60 S.E.2d 151 (1950); Batley v. Ritchie,
73 Utah 320, 273 Pac. 969 (1928). Contra, City of Columbus v. Barr, 160
Ohio St. 209, 115 N.E.2d 391 (1953); Allen v. City of Norfolk, 195 Va. 844,
80. S.E.2d 605 (1954).
47. Remmer v. Municipal Court of City and County of San Francisco,
90 Cal. App. 2d 854, 204 P.2d 92 (1949).
48. Sternall v. Strand, 76 Cal. App. 2d 432, 172 P.2d 921 (1946); Clemons
v. Wilson, 151 Kan. 250, 98 P.2d 423 (1940); Contra, Curtus v. Hutchingson,
14 La. App. 588, 170 So. 133 (1936).
49. City of Amory v. Yielding, 203 Miss. 265, 34 So. 2d 726, 727, 728 (1948)
(Liquor); City of Cape Girardeau v. Pankey. 224 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Mo. 1949):
Ex parte Parks, 67 N.E.2d 459 (Ohio 1946); City of Huntington v. Salyer,
33 W. Va. 397, 63 S.E.2d 575 (1951).
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enumerated in the statutes of that state, this failure to differ-
entiate between the civil and the criminal would seem to be a
shortcoming, if not outright error.
With this in mind there is but one question for the purpose
of this discussion. That being, does the state, either by enact-
ing generally or by remaining silent, pre-empt the field and
estop municipalities from enacting penal ordinances in the
criminal law?
The better opinion would seem to be in accord with the deci-
sion reached by the California Supreme Court in In re Lane,5 1
wherein the court held that the state by enacting generally in
an area had pre-empted the field. In support of that opinion,
it has been said that "a state might, by regulating some but
not all aspects of an area of conduct, be held to have pre-empt-
ed the field so as to exclude further participation by the muni-
cipality.' ' 52 In further support of this position the following
statement was made by the Louisiana Court in City of Alex-
andria v. La Combe: 53
"When the Legislature in its latest enactment removed
from a municipality the power which it had previously
given to it to define gambling and itself passed a law spec-
ifically defining it, it intended to occupy the whole field
of legislation on the subject and merely left the munici-
pality with the concurrent power to suppress it in the
manner as defined by that law."
The further extension to pre-emption by silence is to be
found in the comments of the court in City of Shreveport v.
Maloney,'4 where the court struck down an ordinance making
a certain type of gambling illegal by saying, "The law making
power has remained strictly silent upon the subject.. .." Thus,
it is submitted that the municipality may not, in the absence
of expressly granted authority, enact an ordinance making a
criminal offense that which is not made an offense against the
state.
50. See In re Lane, supra note 3 (dissenting opinion). It would appear
that the dissenting judge failed to recognize the distinction.
51. Supra note 3.
52. Scott, Municipal Penal Ordinances in Colorado, 30 Rocky Mt. L. Rev.
267, 274 (1958).
53. City of Alexandria v. La Combe, 220 La. 618, 57 So. 2d 206, 210
(1952); Gazotti v. City and County of Denver, 352 P.2d 963 (Colo. 1960);
Commonwealth v. Wolbarst, 319 Mass. 291, 65 N.E.2d 552 (1946); Walsh v.
City of Union, 13 Or. 589, 11 Pac. 312 (1886).
54. 7 La. 193, 31 So. 702, 703 (1902); City of Baton Rouge v. Weis, 141




"The trial and punishment of offenses defined by the laws
of the state is not a municipal affair,"' and "a municipal cor-
poration cannot punish for an offense against the criminal
laws of the state." 56 In all doubtful cases it would be better for
municipal authorities to arrest and commit offenders for trial
before a proper state tribunal.
5 7
It is acknowledged that there is a vast split of authority in
this area, and that the fore mentioned authority does not want
for opposition. However, it is felt that it is the better opinion.
From a comprehensive study of the field it would seem that
the primary cause of conflict is the desire of the municipalities
to exercise more and more power by weight of their own ordi-
nances. The fact that municipalities are already bound to en-
force the laws of the state would seem reason enough for deny-
ing them the power to try and convict in the face of state legis-
lation or pre-emption.
Pre-emption and pre-emption by silence are clearly valid
labels for legislative intent. This would seem to be particularly
true in the area of criminal law, 5 and would seem to be the
more plausible approach to legislative intent in this area.
In short, much confusion and possible injustice would cease
to exist in the criminal law if both pre-emption by general en-
actment or by silence were adopted; thus leaving the task of
enumerating criminal acts in its rightful place-in the legisla-
tive bodies of the several states.
GEORGE R. LAWRENCE
MAURICE E. COOK
55. Robert v. Police Court of City and County of San Francisco, 148 Cal.
131, 82 Pac. 838, 840 (1905) (concurring opinion).
56. Dannie v. City of Atlanta, 10 Ga. 471, 73 S.E. 684, 685 (1912); 6 Mc-
QUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 23.05 (3d ed. 1949).
57. Jenkins v. Mayor, 35 Ga. 146 (1886); see 6 McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS § 23.05 (3d ed. 1949).
58. It has been found that a great deal more latitude has been granted
to municipalities in areas of purely civil nature.
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